This Report will summarize the consensus views 1 of the Expert Group on the practical implications of the suggestions contained in paragraph 32 of the April 26 Paper.
Background
Debtor countries normally approach the IMF for financial assistance only when they have lost market access and exhausted other means of financing. By the time the Fund is consulted, the private capital markets will have reached a collective judgment that someone --perhaps everyone --is at risk of losing money in the debtor country (let us call that country "Debtorania"). Markets can, of course, be wrong in these judgments. Investors may turn skittish for a number of reasons that are unrelated to the economic fundamentals of Debtorania. These may include a reaction to the misbehavior or misfortune of a sovereign debtor elsewhere in the world, adversity in the global financial picture generally, a significant shift in interest rates, a currency crisis, an unexpected (and alarming) political development in Debtorania or elsewhere, and so forth.
Skittish markets can be characterized by a herd mentality; individual investors exiting primarily because they see other investors exiting. Herds are no doubt occasionally spooked needlessly, but there must also be times when the herd --or the more discerning members of the herd --have sensed the presence of a pride of lions in the tall grass. It may be difficult for the IMF to know in every case whether Debtorania's loss of private market access is the result of baseless alarms or whether the market may have correctly diagnosed a serious problem with the sustainability of Debtorania' s stock of debt.
Fund programs that involve advancing the full amount needed to cover anticipated budget deficits and to repay, in full and on time, all items of debt maturing during the program period effectively prejudge the outcome of this question. 2Should Debtorania's problems indeed prove to be structural and chronic (and the loss of market access certainly raises a fair suspicion in this regard), any new official sector loans that repay private sector creditors at par only shift the risk of an eventual debt restructuring onto the shoulders of the official sector.
There are only three tactical options for the Fund at the outset of an adjustment program where the medium term debt sustainability of the member country is in doubt:
1Opinions of individual members of the Expert Group on certain issues sometimes differed.
1.
Lend the country the amount needed to repay in full all obligations maturing during the program period (a "Full Bailout"), 2. Require a full restructuring (affecting principal/interest and maturity) of the country's debt at the outset of the program in order to remove any doubt about the sustainability of that debt stock (a "Pre-eMptive Restructuring"), or 3. Require a milder form of restructuring that pushes maturities out of the program period without imposing principal or interest rate haircuts (a "Reprofiling").
Option 1 shifts the risk of an eventual debt restructuring onto the official sector and allows the original creditors to escape unscathed. Option 2 may force a sovereign debtor into a painful and unnecessary debt restructuring, bruising the debtor's reputation in the capital markets for years to come. That leaves Option 3, a Reprofiling --a temporizing measure to be sure but one that preserves the status quo until a more informed judgment can be made about the likely depth and duration of the country's problems.
The Reprofiling Option
The Expert Group broadly agrees with the suggestion in paragraph 32 of the April 26 Paper that in certain situations Fund programs should presume the need for a stretch out of maturing debt to remove those liabilities from the program period. This presumption, however, should be rebuttable. In cases where the Fund staff is confident that the debtor country is experiencing only a temporary liquidity problem, an adjustment to the repayment profile will not be necessary and should not be undertaken. The Expert Group discussed the advisability of also recognizing an exception for unusual circumstances (such as a clear and present danger of regional contagion), but decided that the IMF would frequently be pressured to avoid or defer a needed Reprofiling on the grounds of "unusual circumstances". There will always be interested parties who will argue that the path of least resistance and risk is a full bailout and the Fund's record of resisting pressure from its larger shareholders in areas where the Fund has discretion is not encouraging. The consensus of the Expert Group was therefore not to recommend an "lunusual circumstances" exemption from the presumptive need for a Reprofiling.
The consensus of the Expert Group was that a Reprofiling should normally affect all outstanding bonds of the debtor country, even those maturing after the program is scheduled to end. Imposing the discomfort of the Reprofiling only on the sovereign's short-dated paper would be inconsistent with the goal of intercreditor equity. Moreover, unless the entire curve is pushed out evenly, the reprofiled bonds could, on their new termns, mature at the same time as some of the untouched instruments, possibly producing an unhealthy spike in the debt profile in the first few years after the program ends.
As for the length of the Reprofiling stretch out, the Expert Group felt this would normally be 3-5 years but should reflect the Fund's assessment of the period required for the fiscal adjustment measures to restore the country to perceived creditworthiness. The stretching out of maturities for 3-5 years will allow the Fund to assess the situation and the country's progress toward economic adjustment. If it turns out that the situation deteriorates or the Fund's initial projections are shown to have been too optimistic, preparations can then be made to implement a more severe form of debt restructuring.
The objectives of a presumptive need for Reprofiling the debt stock of a member country that has lost market access are:
1 . Reduce the call on Fund resources. First and foremost, a Reprofiling obviates the need for the Fund to advance money that immediately bleeds out to repay existing creditors at par. In most cases, this will significantly reduce the size of the official sector rescue package.
2. Allow time for diagnosis. A Reprofiling will take Debtorania out of the market for the period of the stretch out. This will give the Fund time to assess the depth of the problem and the likelihood that the fiscal adjustment measures will succeed in restoring the country to a sustainable position.
3.
Allow time for adjustment measures to take hold. Because Debtorania will not again have to face market scrutiny until the stretch out period ends, the country's fiscal adjustment measures will have time to take hold and show the results that the market would expect to see before lending is resumed.
4. Lock in the private sector. While Debtorania's bonds will continue to trade in the market during the Reprofiling period, the important point is that they will remain in the hands of private sector investors. In the event that adjustment efforts fail and a deeper restructuring becomes necessary, the restructuring burden will be shared equally by all private sector creditors. A migration of the liabilities from the private sector to the official sector of the kind we have seen in the Eurozone periphery will thus be avoided.
6. Allow time to hedge. An institutional investor that felt itself overexposed to Debtorania and did not wish to risk the possibility of a full blown restructuring after the Reprofiling period ends, can use the period of the stretch out to sell or hedge its position in an orderly manner.
7.
Debtor counptr incentives. Everyone will know that a failure to regain market access when the stretch out period ends may force a more severe debt restructuring at that point. This knowledge should create an additional incentive for Debtorania to stick with its fiscal adjustment program.
Risk and Risk Mitigants 1 . Collateral damage. All sovereign debt restructurings, even mild ones, exact a cost. That cost will take the form of a bruised credit reputation for some period of time, deferred reaccess to voluntary markets, higher borrowing costs for both the sovereign and its local corporate issuers and so forth. Putting moral hazard concerns aside, if the eventual costs of a Reprofiling could be calibrated and balanced against the eventual costs of the other two options --a Full Bailout or a Preemptive Restructuring --a completely enlightened decision maker would be able to choose the optimal path, at least in a utilitarian sense. But that will never happen. The counterfactual is never a matter of proof, only speculation.
That said, empirical studies suggest that milder forms of debt restructuring which do not involve outright principal haircuts are forgotten and forgiven by the markets more rapidly.
example of a sovereign debt reprofihing --Uruguay in 2003 --was followed by a new, entirely voluntary, bond issue by Uruguay just 3 1 days after the reprofiling of the country's existing bonds closed in May of that year.
2. Self-fulfilling runs. The second major concern is that the market, faced with the high likelihood of a mandatory maturity extension at the outset of a Fundprescribed adjustment program, could dump the country's bonds prematurely.
The consensus of the Expert Group was that this risk could be managed by designing the policy in such a way as to treat loss of market access as a necessary but not sufficient condition for Reprofiling. Reprofiling would occur only in situations in which the fundamentals of the country --debt levels, primary deficits, and other variables that do not react to market panics --indicate that the country's debt may well be unsustainable. This rules out a vicious circle between expectations of reprofiling and actual reprofiling.
This is not to say that the presence of a reprofiling policy may not lead to an earlier loss of market access. Indeed, the express purpose of the policy is to discourage private sector lending to countries with doubtful debt sustainability on the assumption that the official sector will be there to bail them out completely. Provided that the criteria for reprofiling are defined sufficiently conservatively, earlier loss of market access could actually be a desirable consequence of the policy. Mistakes will no doubt occasionally be made, in both directions --both unnecessary reprofiling of debts, and failing to reprofile debts when this would have been appropriate. But this is preferable to the current situation, in which mistakes tend to all go in the same direction and debt restructurings tend to occur too late, forcing far larger costs on the country and far greater losses on the remaining creditors.
Holdouts
The word "reprofiling" is deliberately euphonious. In truth, a Reprofiling is one species under the broader genus "restructuring". And a debt restructuring is just a polite way of saying that the obligations will not be performed according to their original terms, which is itself merely a delicate way of describing a default.
The sentiment expressed in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 32 of the April 26 paper (to the effect that Reprofilings will be "voluntary" and supported by creditors out of enlightened self-interest) is, in the consensus view of the Expert Group, optimistic. Telling a member country that it will be expected to Reprofile its debt as a condition to IMF support is tantamount to telling the country that it must default on that debt. It is fatuous to believe that all creditors will voluntarily accept even a mild stretch out of their claims. There will be holdouts. 4 The IMF has been notoriously timid in confronting this disagreeable fact of financial life, often hiding behind an informal policy of "never telling a member to default." The Expert Group felt that perhaps the time had come for the Fund to call a spade a shovel.
A presumptive policy of Reprofiling will require the IMF to form a view about the appropriate treatment of holdouts from the Reprofiling exercise. Perhaps at some point in the future aggregated collective action clauses will deal with the holdout creditor problem, but that day is years down the road. For now, there are things the IMF could do to assist member countries in addressing the risks posed by holdout creditors.
5 A good starting point might be a candid admission that a Reprofiling policy will inevitably force member countries to confront the holdout problem.
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